389 lines
11 KiB
C
Executable file
389 lines
11 KiB
C
Executable file
/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.21 2019/03/27 15:34:01 jsing Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter <reyk@openbsd.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
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*/
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
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#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/chacha.h>
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#include <openssl/poly1305.h>
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#include "evp_locl.h"
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#define POLY1305_TAG_LEN 16
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#define CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN 4
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#define CHACHA20_IV_LEN 8
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#define CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN (CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN + CHACHA20_IV_LEN)
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#define XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN 24
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx {
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unsigned char key[32];
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unsigned char tag_len;
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};
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static int
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_init(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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size_t key_len, size_t tag_len)
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{
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx;
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if (tag_len == 0)
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tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
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if (tag_len > POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Internal error - EVP_AEAD_CTX_init should catch this. */
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if (key_len != sizeof(c20_ctx->key))
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return 0;
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c20_ctx = malloc(sizeof(struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx));
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if (c20_ctx == NULL)
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return 0;
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memcpy(&c20_ctx->key[0], key, key_len);
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c20_ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
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ctx->aead_state = c20_ctx;
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return 1;
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}
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static void
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup(EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx)
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{
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struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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freezero(c20_ctx, sizeof(*c20_ctx));
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}
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static void
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poly1305_update_with_length(poly1305_state *poly1305,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
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{
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size_t j = data_len;
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unsigned char length_bytes[8];
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unsigned i;
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(length_bytes); i++) {
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length_bytes[i] = j;
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j >>= 8;
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}
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if (data != NULL)
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, length_bytes, sizeof(length_bytes));
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}
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static void
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(poly1305_state *poly1305,
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
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{
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static const unsigned char zero_pad16[16];
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size_t pad_len;
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, data, data_len);
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/* pad16() is defined in RFC 7539 2.8.1. */
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if ((pad_len = data_len % 16) == 0)
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return;
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CRYPTO_poly1305_update(poly1305, zero_pad16, 16 - pad_len);
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}
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static int
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
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const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
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{
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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poly1305_state poly1305;
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const unsigned char *iv;
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const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
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uint64_t ctr;
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/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
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* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
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* individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
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* in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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* the warning. */
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if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctr = (uint64_t)((uint32_t)(nonce[0]) | (uint32_t)(nonce[1]) << 8 |
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(uint32_t)(nonce[2]) << 16 | (uint32_t)(nonce[3]) << 24) << 32;
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iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
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memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
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sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr + 1);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len);
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if (c20_ctx->tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
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unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
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memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len);
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*out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len;
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return 1;
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}
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len);
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*out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
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const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
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{
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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const unsigned char *iv = nonce;
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poly1305_state poly1305;
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const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
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size_t plaintext_len;
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uint64_t ctr = 0;
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if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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/* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
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* counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
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* individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
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* in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
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* 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
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* Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
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* the warning. */
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if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
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if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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ctr = (uint64_t)((uint32_t)(nonce[0]) | (uint32_t)(nonce[1]) << 8 |
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(uint32_t)(nonce[2]) << 16 | (uint32_t)(nonce[3]) << 24) << 32;
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iv = nonce + CHACHA20_CONSTANT_LEN;
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memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key,
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sizeof(poly1305_key), c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
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if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, c20_ctx->key, iv, ctr + 1);
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*out_len = plaintext_len;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
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const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
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{
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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unsigned char subkey[32];
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poly1305_state poly1305;
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if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_hchacha_20(subkey, c20_ctx->key, nonce);
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, in_len, subkey, nonce + 16, 1);
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memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
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subkey, nonce + 16, 0);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, out, in_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, in_len);
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if (c20_ctx->tag_len != POLY1305_TAG_LEN) {
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unsigned char tag[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, tag);
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memcpy(out + in_len, tag, c20_ctx->tag_len);
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*out_len = in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len;
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return 1;
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}
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, out + in_len);
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*out_len = in_len + POLY1305_TAG_LEN;
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return 1;
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}
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static int
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aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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size_t *out_len, size_t max_out_len, const unsigned char *nonce,
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size_t nonce_len, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
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const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
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{
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const struct aead_chacha20_poly1305_ctx *c20_ctx = ctx->aead_state;
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unsigned char mac[POLY1305_TAG_LEN];
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unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
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unsigned char subkey[32];
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poly1305_state poly1305;
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size_t plaintext_len;
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if (in_len < c20_ctx->tag_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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plaintext_len = in_len - c20_ctx->tag_len;
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if (max_out_len < plaintext_len) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_hchacha_20(subkey, c20_ctx->key, nonce);
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memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(poly1305_key, poly1305_key, sizeof(poly1305_key),
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subkey, nonce + 16, 0);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_init(&poly1305, poly1305_key);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, ad, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_pad16(&poly1305, in, plaintext_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, ad_len);
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poly1305_update_with_length(&poly1305, NULL, plaintext_len);
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CRYPTO_poly1305_finish(&poly1305, mac);
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if (timingsafe_memcmp(mac, in + plaintext_len, c20_ctx->tag_len) != 0) {
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EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT);
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_chacha_20(out, in, plaintext_len, subkey, nonce + 16, 1);
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*out_len = plaintext_len;
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return 1;
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}
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/* RFC 7539 */
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static const EVP_AEAD aead_chacha20_poly1305 = {
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.key_len = 32,
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.nonce_len = CHACHA20_NONCE_LEN,
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.overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN,
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.max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN,
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.init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
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.cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
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.seal = aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal,
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.open = aead_chacha20_poly1305_open,
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};
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const EVP_AEAD *
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EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305()
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{
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return &aead_chacha20_poly1305;
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}
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static const EVP_AEAD aead_xchacha20_poly1305 = {
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.key_len = 32,
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.nonce_len = XCHACHA20_NONCE_LEN,
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.overhead = POLY1305_TAG_LEN,
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.max_tag_len = POLY1305_TAG_LEN,
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.init = aead_chacha20_poly1305_init,
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.cleanup = aead_chacha20_poly1305_cleanup,
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.seal = aead_xchacha20_poly1305_seal,
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.open = aead_xchacha20_poly1305_open,
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};
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const EVP_AEAD *
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EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305()
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{
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return &aead_xchacha20_poly1305;
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}
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#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA && !OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 */
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